

I. MILITARY ESCALATION AIMED AT NEGOTIATING VICTORY

Expand military operations, including forces, into Cambodia and perhaps increased troop levels and resumption of bombing, aimed at obtaining withdrawal of all subversive forces with maintenance of current GVN in 1-2 years.

Beliefs of Advocates

1. Present allied efforts have the enemy on the ropes, but are not sufficient to knock him out. By applying additional pressure now, we can prevent him from recouping and make clear the great costs of continuing aggression.
2. This approach would require a greater U.S. effort in the short term, but will enable us to withdraw more safely in the mid- and longer-term.
3. Because any other alternative would lead, at best, to a confused situation, our allies will support us and U.S. public opinion will tolerate course.

Military Actions

1. Increase search and destroy operations aimed at seeking out and attriting the enemy.
2. Conduct operations in Cambodia and increase operations in Laos aimed at closing VC supply routes.
3. Perhaps resume bombing of 190, or on previous pattern, or more extensive bombing and mining of Haiphong.
4. Perhaps increase U.S. troop levels to 750,000 or one million.

Paris

1. Accept GVN lead on procedural matters.
2. Break off talks if Hanoi responds to U.S. expansion by violating the DMZ, attacking cities, or increasing infiltration.
3. Seek to negotiate withdrawal of all Communist forces from SVN with current GVN still in power.

GVN

1. Emphasize need for stability; support present government.
2. Urge but not demand reforms.

Cost

1. Budget costs remain at at least \$30 billion/year; could go up to \$40 billion.
2. Casualties increase to 300 or more per week.

Consequences

1. Some believe expansion will lead to victory in 6-12 months; others believe it will come in 2-5 years. On this view Hanoi should be willing to make major concessions when U.S. escalation becomes evident. Many in Group B doubt that any currently proposed or practically conceivable level of U.S. military pressure will defeat the enemy or destroy his will to the point where he is prepared to withdraw leaving the current GVN in power, unchallenged.
2. Further Americanization of the war.
3. Some danger of greatly increased war with larger participation by China or Russia.
4. Increased domestic opposition.